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Introduction
A good way to start a discussion of the relations of the U.S., China, and
Northeast Asian Security is to remind ourselves of the importance of U.S. alli-
ances in NEA. This is a factor that many analysts consider instrumental in
bringing about the peace and stability that has allowed so much Asian eco-
nomic and political progress in the latter half of this century.   These U.S. alli-
ances with Japan and the ROK are the bedrock of East Asian security from the
American point of view. However, change will come on the Korean Peninsula, at
some time and in some form that is hard to predict. At that time, there will be
serious questions about the need and wisdom of keeping American forces in
significant numbers in NEA. There will be at least adjustments in numbers,
missions, and capabilities. My concern is that we will act too quickly, change
things we wish we had not changed, and live to regret our hasty actions.
So much for the American view. Let me now turn to the Chinese viewpoint.
The Beijing-Moscow “strategic partnership” is proclaimed by Chinese leaders
as a model of security relations: Alliances are considered “Cold War thinking,
inevitably implying alliance adversaries, there is to be no hegemony or power
politics, and there should be a new political and economic world order based on
a multicolor rather than univocal world. These may be rather grand-sounding
words, but they are China’s dream, one that is, at least at first look, incompatible
with the aspirations of the U.S. to retain its bilateral alliances as the most promi-
nent aspect of security in the region.
China is no longer sure that American presence in Japan serves China’s
interests. Yes, the U.S. military presence curbs Japanese militarism (a great fear
in China), but now there are the revised Defense Guidelines for the Japan-U.S.
security arrangements and the prospect of TMD for Japan. Beijing considers
these as factors likely to encourage the resurgence of Japanese militarism. Ja-
pan, China argues, will forget the word self in the term Japanese Self-Defense
Force and consider that the entire Asia-Pacific region is encompassed in Japan’s
security area. TMD joint research, according to Beijing, will make technology
available to Japan to facilitate development of ballistic missiles that can be
tipped with nuclear warheads. Japan, the Chinese assert, could develop nuclear
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weapons in a very short time.   To most American specialists on Japanese Secu-
rity, these are not well-founded fears. Too many, they are at least irrational
concerns if not absurd conclusions, but they are very real to the Chinese. A
Future Security Architecture
With these factors in mind, it is appropriate now to see how we might move
toward a new or evolving security framework for Northeast Asia. It must be said
at the outset that, to my knowledge, no one is seriously proposing anything
resembling one of the two prominent extremes of security architecture, NATO
and the ARF, as a likely model for the countries of Northeast Asia—a region of
countries and relationships that resemble neither Europe nor Southeast Asia. It
should also be said that there is essentially nothing now that suggests a new or
modified framework need be formal, or even that it be defined or documented in
any sort of rigorous way.
To the contrary, those who are thinking about the transition are intention-
ally and consistently employing abstract (even vague) terms such as security
architecture or security framework. There may be several good reasons for do-
ing this: (1) it is difficult to forecast both the context in which the framework
might operate and the types of challenges it might face. (2) Commitments made
now may be sorely regretted later, especially as they might apply to promises of
force levels, funding, host-nation support, base structure, etc. (3) There is no
evidence or previous experience with the regional countries that suggests that
a formal structure is the best approach; most observers think there is more
reason to favor an unstructured arrangement, an informal framework. My point
here is that no one should expect that Washington, or others, will try now to
present a concrete proposal about a new framework for regional security. The
time is not yet right.
The existing framework, it should be remembered, did not originate as a
formal structure and has not over the years taken on an institutionalized form,
even as it matured. Instead, it has gradually evolved into a complex matrix of
treaty commitments, joint communiqués and declarations, explicit and implicit
understandings, and guidelines; there are even important elements that derive
from national constitutions and domestic laws, among other things. Yet this
accumulation of diverse components has been, for the most part, quite success-
ful for several decades in preventing the outbreak of hostilities, deterring ag-
gression, and discouraging military adventures—despite profound regional di-
visions and differences. Moreover, the security situation created has promoted,
or at least permitted, remarkable stability, political development, and economic
37
 Number 6, 1999The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
progress (notwithstanding the recent financial crisis).
There is food for thought here in considering how to proceed. These
results seem to argue, at a minimum, for the exercise of caution in discarding
components of the existing structure. The analogy of children playing with
blocks comes to mind. There is, in contemplating the reconstruction necessary
to shape a future security framework, much to say here for carefully rearranging
the blocks rather than knocking down the whole stack and starting over. Never-
theless, considerable thought needs to be given to at least the preferred general
shape of the new structure it seems inevitable, (especially after there is some
form of resolution on the Korean Peninsula that the existing framework will take
on a new shape possibly more fundamentally changed than at the end of the
Cold War. That implies opportunity but also possible peril.
One viewpoint concerning a new architecture, as described previously, is
that the U.S. alliances with Japan and the ROK should, for the foreseeable
future, remain important, solid elements of any framework. Adjustments to the
U.S. military presence in Asia may well be warranted, even demanded by both
the American public and Congress and host governments, but the alliances
would remain essentially intact. Advocates of this viewpoint emphasize the
benefits that have come about for all nations of the region from the stability that
has been a product of the American presence and its important alliances. Even
countries like North Korea that complain the loudest about the U.S. presence
have, on occasion, acknowledged that the U.S. presence has been a beneficial,
stabilizing factor. China has on many occasions expressed the view that it is
more content about Japan as a consequence of the U.S.-Japan arrangements
and far from unhappy about the effects of U.S. presence in South Korea. The
character of the U.S. presence and the degree of cooperation and support pro-
vided by the ROK and Japan have been carefully considered and calibrated over
the decades. The recently revised Defense Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan secu-
rity alliance are a notable example of the most deliberate and carefully conceived
adjustment, taking into account domestic considerations as well as the chang-
ing security situation. Although all will not agree, the new guidelines are consid-
ered by those who designed them to provide greater clarity concerning commit-
ments and obligations, to prevent surprises (to all concerned, including Beijing)
during a time of crisis, and to avoid the. Perception that such cooperation is
provocative or threatening to others.
My own personal, and admittedly not wholly objective, view is that it
would be foolhardy to take precipitous action in altering the U.S. alliances or the
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American presence in East Asia. It is simply too early to forecast what the
security environment will be in the aftermath of changes in Korea. New threats
to peace and stability may take many forms, some we understand now and some
that we may have trouble imagining at present. Furthermore, it is imprudent
unnecessarily to take actions that may become essentially irrevocable. For ex-
ample, because of various American domestic factors as well as regional ones,
the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Asia mad be an action that would be almost
impossible to reverse once taken. No responsible government wants to see a
dangerous power vacuum in the region or a rush to fill such a void, should it
occur. Even for the most adamant America bashers, the U.S. is the “devil they
know.”
It is evident, of course, that Beijing’s concept of a future security architec-
ture would not include as prominent features U.S. security alliances, and may
well favor their dissolution. Although Beijing has never been in a hurry for the
American alliances to end, there is the long-term view held by many in China
that Asian security problems should eventually be the exclusive domain of
Asian countries—that the oft-stated Chinese preference for no troops on for-
eign soil is more than a self-serving slogan.
China wants its role as an emerging major regional nation fully recognized.
Beijing rails against what it calls American attempts at hegemony, and Washing-
ton does not want China to assume any such dominant posture. Nonetheless,
fear of hegemony, by any party, must not obscure the fact that China is the
largest and most populous country of the region and that it has legitimate aspi-
rations for a constructive role in the security affairs of the region. It seems to me
that this conviction on the part of Beijing is an underlying element of the strate-
gic partnership concept that China has announced with Russia and advocated
as the way of the future. To explain this way, China does not want to see itself as
the apparent, if unnamed, adversary of alliances in the region and understand-
ably wants instead to be a part of the architecture.
I have highlighted the importance to Washington of its traditional bilateral
alliances as central features of any new security architecture and tried to capture
some of Beijing’s concerns. New importance, however, should be attached to
what has been called a “growing pattern of security pluralism.” This pattern, of
course, includes multilateral security dialogues, the most prominent of which is
the ARF. It is not, in my opinion, inappropriate to mention the ARF in a North-
east Asian context, not because that body is attempting to intrude outside its
region (Southeast Asia) but rather because the ARF is providing a venue where
39
 Number 6, 1999The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
nations of Northeast Asia meet and discuss security matters—such issues as
confidence building and transparency, which might seldom if ever arise natu-
rally and without direct confrontation in other meetings. This demonstrates the
applicability of such methods to Northeast Asia.
As the U.S. Department of Defense’s 1998 East Asia Strategy Report states:
“Multilateralism in all its forms will become an important element of U.S. engage-
ment in the region in coming years.” Only a short time back, neither Washington
nor Beijing thought well of the concept of multilateralism. Americans thought
multilateralism threatened its important bilateral arrangements. The Chinese con-
sidered multilateralism as a way for others to gang up on China. So, the Ameri-
can vision of security in Northeast Asia is a network of overlapping and inter-
locking institutions and relationships that “establish a diverse and flexible’ frame-
work for promoting common security in the Asia-Pacific region into the next
century,” to quote the U.S. Department of Defense’s East Asia Security Report
(EASR) once more. Beijing might ascribe too much of this multilateral thinking
as well. I am exceedingly encouraged by this vision.
Let me now introduce a radical concept, at least in the eyes of some Asians.
As I spoke in Seoul two years ago when the Symposium on Northeast Asian
Security (SNEAS) was held at KIDA, more than one eyebrow was raised as a
consequence of my suggesting that Beijing must be part of the process, “that it
will be far better for Beijing to be a part of the framework for security in Northeast
Asia than to feel itself an outsider, or worse, an adversary,” as I said then. Far
fewer eyebrows are raised these days, not because my insight was so brilliant or
revolutionary but rather because so many people who are working hard on the
problems of security in Northeast Asia has arrived at the same conclusion. I
remain convinced of the validity of this assertion even in the light of the down-
turn in U.S.-China relations following the tragic mistaken bombing of the Chi-
nese embassy in Belgrade and the demonstrations and destruction of American
diplomatic buildings in China. There can and must be room for China in a frame-
work based on security pluralism.
Thus we see that there are two largely contradictory (possibly even dia-
metrically opposed) views of the role of bilateral alliances in the regional secu-
rity architecture. However, the concept of security pluralism seems to hold the
promise of finding a middle ground. Consequently, the real issue at hand, it
seems to me, is not to choose one view over the other but rather to find a way to
accommodate both views of the role of alliances and to make the most of the
emergence of pluralism, a concept in which, incidentally but importantly,
Mongolia can find its proper place.
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As suggested previously, it may be that China could find the concept of-
bilateral alliances far less egregious if it did not inevitably have to conclude that
the alliances target China. Among the first steps along such a path might be
fostering the realization that alliances need not have identified adversaries, tar-
get countries, as their reason for existence and that no country need be a target
of these alliances unless its conduct makes it so. These realizations, despite
their simplicity, cannot be brought about with a sweep of the hand and a few
happy words, but actions consistent with these concepts by all the capitals
involved can foster credibility and make the ideas easier to accept as part of the
new security framework.
This concept can be worded another way: No country which desires to be
an integral part of the security architecture can be seen as a looming threat to
regional security and stability. This will require a good measure of introspection
by all the countries that aspire to be constructive components of a new frame-
work.
In this regard, there are several important questions that we should ask of
ourselves. How does Washington explain what it sees as its role in a new or
modified framework in such a way that even the detractors, the America bashers,
know that the U.S does not aspire to be a regional hegemony? Does Washing-
ton need to make it even clearer that it sees U.S. interests best served by stable,
open, and prosperous nations in East Asia, not only clearly progressive coun-
tries like Mongolia but also unquestionably including an undemocratic China?
How does Japan more effectively convince its neighbors that its goal is not a
militaristic future? Does China have to do more to earn a place in the architecture
and to demonstrate that it will not threaten Mongolia militarily or economically,
for example? How might China cut the Gordian knot of the Taiwan issue? How
does it deal with the firm convictions by others that Taiwan is not wholly an
internal issue and that a peaceful resolution of the problem is the only way that
makes sense? What are the ingredients that will make a unified Korea a welcome
part of the framework? What are the appropriate places for Mongolia and Russia
in the new architecture? To the extent that we are unwilling to address these
questions with candor and a desire to understand the views of other capitals, we
make any future security framework less strong and less stable.
The future will bring new and different security architecture for the region.
This prospect has great promise and should be approached with optimism and
enthusiasm. However, it is also a sobering task, so I conclude with a list of seven
reminders of the various formulas that would likely result in failure to construct
41
 Number 6, 1999The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
a stable and effective new security framework for Northeast Asia. We must
avoid these formulas for failure: (1) seeking formality and rigidity in composition
and organizational structure—the fallacy of attempting to form something like
NATO in Northeast Asia, (2) failing to appreciate China’s appropriate place in
the architecture and ignoring Beijing’s views in shaping the concept, (3) pre-
judging the outcome on the Korean peninsula; i.e., assuming we can forecast
the precise form of the resolution of the Korean problem, (4) waiting until after
change on the Korean Peninsula to lay the groundwork—to consider seriously
what will foster a stable and enduring framework, (5) acting hastily in reconsid-
ering and readjusting American alliances and forward presence in Asia, (6) fail-
ing to include all the countries of the region and to find a way to blend the
bilateral, the multilateral, and the miniature mechanisms that all have roles to
play, and (7) assuming we can understand and foresee the nature of future
security contingencies that will threaten the region.
This is admittedly a daunting task, especially when one recognizes that no
one is in charge and that no one can be in charge. This has to be, it seems to me,
an international collegial effort. That heightens the challenge, but it also, one
can hope, heightens the prospects that the new framework will sufficiently and
appropriately reflect the composition and character of region so that it will not
be subjected to assaults from those who feel they have been shunned or ig-
nored, whether those be lesser or greater powers. There is good reason to fear
that a new framework will be doomed to instability if it is constantly being
shaken by outsiders who are either trying to get in or trying to dismantle the
structure. This is not to suggest that making the new security framework inclu-
sive of all who should be part of the architecture will be an easy task. However,
despite the extent of the difficulty, it will be easier to resolve these problems now
than to try later to cope with the inevitable assaults on the framework by those
who have been left out in the cold. Having said all this, the most challenging
aspect of developing a new architecture, largely and unavoidably derived from
traditional security perspectives may be to apply this architecture to a new
world of non-traditional security concerns, for example the peacekeeping opera-
tions that Mongolia’s forces may become well suited to conduct. But that, of
course, is the subject of another speech, one that I would welcome the opportu-
nity to deliver on another visit to your impressive and beautiful country.
